BEFORE
THE STANDING COMMITTEE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
2021 REPORTS OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA
REPORT 5—FOLLOW-UP AUDIT ON RAIL SAFETY—TRANSPORT CANADA
6 May 2021
1.
Madam Chair,
thank you for this opportunity to discuss the results of our recent follow-up
audit of Transport Canada’s oversight of rail safety. Joining me today are Dawn
Campbell, the principal responsible for the audit, and Isabelle Marsolais, who was
part of the audit team.
2.
In this
audit, we examined whether Transport Canada implemented selected
recommendations from our 2013 audit on the oversight of rail safety. Overall,
we found that 8 years later, the department had yet to fully address our
recommendations and that, in fact, there was still much to do to improve the
oversight of rail safety in Canada.
3.
Rail
accidents can have serious consequences, including devastating loss of life and
environmental damage. To mitigate safety threats, Transport Canada undertakes
oversight activities that include inspections, audits of safety management
systems, and data analysis. We want to focus today on 2 fundamental gaps in the
department’s oversight activities that require immediate attention.
4.
Our first
concern is that Transport Canada was
not assessing the effectiveness of railway companies’ safety management systems.
5.
These systems are formal frameworks to proactively
integrate safety into day-to-day railway operations. In-depth, systematic
assessments of these systems are called audits. They are meant to verify whether
the systems meet regulatory requirements and integrate safety into daily railway
operations.
6.
Over
the past 14 years, several reports have recommended that Transport Canada
undertake such assessments. I am referring here to 3 reports from this
very committee, a number of other reports from experts in the field, and my office’s
2013 audit.
7.
We found
that although the scope of Transport Canada’s audits of safety management
systems had included assessing regulatory compliance, the department had not considered
whether the systems were effective in improving safety in daily operations. Unless
the department makes these assessments and follows up in a timely way, it
cannot know whether these systems are having an impact on rail safety.
8.
Our second
concern is that Transport
Canada was unable to show whether its oversight activities have improved rail safety
overall. The department has made
important improvements to the way it plans and prioritizes its activities and
follows up on railway companies’ plans and actions to address deficiencies.
However, it did not measure the overall effectiveness of its rail safety
oversight activities. When people and time are dedicated to overseeing rail safety, I believe it is reasonable to expect that
the department measure if the time and effort invested are making a difference
and to adjust its oversight approach as needed.
9.
I
encourage Transport Canada to consider what other programs and jurisdictions are
doing on this front, both in Canada and in other countries. The Canada Energy
Regulator, for example, has established indicators that measure components of
effectiveness. In the United Kingdom, the Office of Rail and Road has developed
tools to assess railway companies’ ability to manage health and safety risks.
The resulting information is used to make year-over-year progress comparisons. Furthermore,
in the United States, the Office of Transit Safety and Oversight has committed
to monitoring the effectiveness of state safety agencies.
10. We made 6 recommendations to Transport Canada, and the Department has agreed with all of them. I can’t underscore enough the importance of taking action on these long-standing issues.
11. Madam Chair, this concludes my opening remarks. We would be pleased to answer the committee’s questions. Thank you.